LOCAL

Park didn't heed Gatlinburg firestorm 'call to action'

Don Jacobs
USA TODAY NETWORK - Tennessee
  • National Park Service announces it will review decisions in Gatlinburg fire
  • Experts said Chimney Tops 2 fire should have been doused immediately
  • Fire fighting resources requested too late to stop firestorm
  • Firefighters slept while flames jumped to ridges on march to Gatlinburg

Officials should have doused a 1.5-acre fire in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park days before high winds created a megafire that swept into Gatlinburg, former U.S. Forest Service firefighters said .

The wildfire-scarred Chimney Tops is pictured Friday, Dec. 2, 2016, in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Officials say the fire that has killed 13 people and destroyed more than 700 structures started here on Nov, 23. The fire is human caused and under investigation.

At the very least, said retired employees with almost 200 years of firefighting experience, officials in the National Park should have summoned every resource available when alerted Nov. 26 of the expected high winds.

"I've written for years that the best way to keep fires from becoming megafires is to attack them with overwhelming force, both on the ground and from the air," said Bill Gabbert, who writes an online blog about wildland fires and aviation resources to battle wildland fires.

"People say that is very expensive, but it is not as expensive as losing 14 lives and $500 million in lost structures."

Gabbert has written three articles on wildfiretoday.com about the Gatlinburg fires, providing technical data about fire conditions and aerial resources available to firefighters.

Four other former U.S. Forest Service firefighters agreed park officials didn't pay attention to the severe drought, low humidity that provided a tinderbox for flames, available options to quell the slow-moving fire before winds made the flames uncontrollable and alarming weather forecasts.

National Park Deputy Superintendent Clay Jordan, however, said all the options outlined by park Fire Management Officer Greg Salansky, who oversaw the Chimney Tops 2 fire, "made sense to me."

"There was no way the fire could have been extinguished before the winds came," Jordan said.

When the winds came, the fire ignored Salansky's containment plan.

"Much to our surprise, it had spotted across Newfound Gap Road to Bullhead Ridge a half mile to a mile away," Jordan said.

"Our fire manager has never seen fire spot that far. It was unheard of around here."

An investigation by the News Sentinel also found:

  • Near extreme drought conditions and low humidity levels, even without a high wind forecast, should have prompted immediate action to extinguish the Chimney Tops 2 fire when first discovered Nov. 23;
  • Although National Park officials said they established a 410-acre containment zone around the 1.5-acre wildland fire, no one turned the first spade of dirt for several days to contain the flames;
  • A hazardous weather outlook from the Morristown office of the National Weather Service two days before the disaster warning of wind gusts of more than 60 mph should have been "a call to action" for firefighters, but no direct attack on the fire was initiated;
  • Park officials should have requested additional firefighters before Sunday, Nov. 27, increasing chances enough fire could be extinguished before winds carried embers miles toward Gatlinburg;
  • When additional firefighters were requested, officials thought 27 would suffice to control the fire, but eventually almost 800 firefighters joined the battle;
  • In an apparent breach of policy, no one monitored the Chimney Tops 2 fire when high winds swept flames to other ridges a mile away; and
  • The first direct attack on the fire didn't occur until it had grown to 35 acres four days after it was discovered, and that suppression started late Nov. 27, limiting the number of airborne water dumps on the flames.

"It bears looking at how those decisions were made, not to blame somebody, but to avoid issues in the future," said Barry Hicks, a retired U.S. Forest Service smokejumper with 41 years of service.

Chimney Tops fires

On Nov. 13, the first human-caused fire was discovered along the 2-mile-long Chimney Tops Trail. The fire covered one-quarter of an acre with lean duff — decaying leaves and fallen logs on the forest floor — producing flames no more than a foot high.

"It was in the area of the trail where people usually take a break before the rock scramble," Jordan said. "This is one of the most popular trails in the park."

Firefighters with the Great Smoky Mountains National Park took four days to douse a one-quarter acre fire Nov. 13 alongside the popular trail.

Firefighters used tools to remove fuel from the fire, raking away duff and yanking down vines. Efforts restricted the slow-moving, backing fire to one-quarter of an acre and extinguished it Nov. 16.

"Four days is pretty short on a forest fire if you can't get water to it," Jordan said.

"This is a temperate rain forest. Normally, you would have moisture in the duff, but with the drought that wasn't the case."

On Nov. 23, Salansky was checking on a reported car fire on Newfound Gap Road about 5:20 p.m. when he saw fire and smoke that later was labeled Chimney Tops 2.

The day before, the National Weather Service had listed the area of Gatlinburg and the National Park in an "extreme drought" and "exceptional drought" condition. Those conditions had spawned fires consuming 44,000 acres in Tennessee, prompting on Nov. 14 the governor to impose a fire ban in the eastern half of the state.  National Park officials on Nov. 15 banned any campfires.

Salansky trekked up the Chimney Tops Trail with a firefighter to investigate the fire that officials later said was caused by two teenage boys from Anderson County. The pair face criminal charges of aggravated arson in Sevier County Juvenile Court.

Because of nightfall, Salansky opted to return the next morning to further investigate what appeared to be a creeping fire among the rock voids of extremely steep terrain beyond the terminus of the trail. He deemed an attempt to direct attack the fire too dangerous.

Fire plan devised

When Salansky assessed the 1.5-acre Chimney Tops 2 fire, he had overseen handling of 10 fires involving 160 acres since being named in January the fire management officer at the National Park. He had 30 years of service with the National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service.

Because of 100-foot cliffs and difficult terrain, Salansky decided he could not endanger firefighters by having them direct attack the back burning, creeping fire. Instead, he designed a 410-acre containment area using the West Prong of the Pigeon River, the Road Prong and Chimney Tops trails and an unnamed drainage and tributary.

"That is how extreme that terrain is," Jordan said. "That's where we made our defense."

Those natural features comprised about 90 percent of the boundaries, leaving the remainder to be cobbled out manually by removing flammable vegetation and fallen logs.

While officials said five to 10 of the park's 18 firefighters were "on the scene" each day from Thursday to Saturday, they won't say when firefighters turned the first spade of dirt to complete the containment line.

"It didn't have a lot of potential at that time," said Molly Schroer, National Park spokeswoman. "It was such a slow-burning fire and there wasn't a lot of burning vegetation there."

National Park Service Wildland Fire Management policy in 2014 calls for suppression of human-caused wildland fires "at the lowest cost with the fewest negative consequences with respect to firefighter and public safety."

If park officials opt instead to manage the fire, "that decision will be documented as part of the official record," according to the 2014 policy. The National Park Service policy encourages Minimum Impact Strategy and Tactics (MIST) in handling wildland fires.

"Simply put, MIST is a ‘do least damage' policy," the document states.

The policy, however, cautions officials to consider fire conditions and apply good judgment in actions.

Jordan said Salansky "had run a (computer) model that predicted it would burn slowly and it might reach our containment lines Monday or Tuesday."

Because of the upward movement of heat, a fire moves about six times faster uphill than a downhill burn.

"It made sense when he walked me through it," Jordan said.

Retired firefighters said Salansky basically treated the Chimney Tops 2 fire as a prescribed burn by allowing it to consume 410 acres before attacking it. A controlled burn to rid an area of flammable duff and allow indigenous plants to flourish usually involves a year of planning and paperwork before it is approved.

By National Park Service policy, Salansky's plan to handle the fire had to be approved by the park superintendent. Because Superintendent Cassius Cash was on leave or out of town – officials won't say – that responsibility fell to Jordan.

Tactics questioned

Jordan agreed terrain prevented firefighters from reaching the fire, and he rejected the idea that aircraft could douse the Chimney Tops 2 fire. Helicopters and air tankers already were staged in Chattanooga because of the severe drought and fires afflicting Tennessee, North Carolina and Georgia.

"There's no way to put out a fire like that, not even with bucket drops," Jordan said. "Water won't put out a fire, it decreases the intensity of it.

"Using water drops would serve no purpose."

Three of the former Forest Service employees questioned why a trained Hotshot crew — a team that specialize in working on steep terrain — wasn't dispatched to douse the flames. Yet the retirees conceded that without visiting the site, they could not dispute Salansky's decision it was unsafe for firefighters.

"I can't help but think they could have and should have come up with a plan to stop the progress of the fire or put it out entirely," Gabbert said. He oversaw fire management for seven national parks before retiring in 2003 with 33 years of service.

Johnny Yount, who tallied 46 years of fighting wildland fires from the air, said Jordan generally is correct in saying aerial water dumps don't extinguish fires.

"It's like a campfire," Yount said. "It's best if you can get in there and stir it up.

"But if the only option you had is to dump water, you drop water until it's out. That was a fire that needed to be aggressively attacked from the air with helicopters."

An Air National Guard helicopter prepares to retrieve water from the Little River before dropping it on a wildfire in Blount County near Walland Elementary School Friday, Nov. 18, 2016.

Yount said helicopters using Bambi Buckets filled from nearby lakes would pour water on the outer edges of the fire. A 2,000-gallon Bambi Bucket empties its contents through an 18-inch hole in about eight seconds.

"You don't worry about the interior of the fire, it'll burn itself out," he said.

Yount said an aerial attack on Nov. 24 would have extinguished the fire in "about four hours." The fire then was a little more than the size of a football field, including end zones.

"An acre and a half, the thing would be washed down into the creek," he said. "It would be mud."

Yount said of the thousands of fires he's fought, twice he was able to extinguish flames with an aerial attack when firefighters could not get to the site. Both times saved nearby homes from approaching flames.

Weather trumps plans

Each day the Chimney Tops 2 fire continued to grow, creeping downhill toward containment lines where Salansky had decided to make a stand. By Nov. 26, the fire covered 8 acres.

While drought conditions provided flammable fuel, firefighters were aided by a weather inversion keeping a cold layer of air trapped under warmer air. That kept flames down.

At 3:21 a.m. Nov. 26, firefighters got their first indication the weather was no longer their friend. Relative humidity was going to plummet Nov. 26-27 and winds were going to increase, according to the Morristown office of the National Weather Service.

The "hazardous weather outlook" warned "strong southerly winds will develop Monday night" in front of a series of storm systems. Those winds would reach 35-50 mph "with gusts over 60 mph possible across the higher terrain."

Gabbett said the severe drought, coupled with the energy release component of dry fuels "even without the wind, should have been a concern, but when you add the winds, it should have been alarming to a fire manager and started an immediate attack."

The Saturday, Nov. 26 report "would be a call to action," Gabbert said.

"Those (aerial) resources could have been called that should have been called two days earlier from Chattanooga," he said.

Officials in the National Park did nothing and declined to respond to criticism about their inaction.

A 9:03 a.m. Sunday, Nov. 27, "special weather statement" may have caught the attention of park officials, but they refused to respond to questions about the alert of "enhanced fire danger" developing that day.

The report warned of "critically dry conditions" early that afternoon, with relative humidity dipping into the teens. Those circumstances mean "wildfires will be easier to ignite and much harder to control."

In the late afternoon of Nov. 27, the day before the wildfire swept into Gatlinburg, three helicopters made the first direct attack on the 5-day-old Chimney Tops 2 fire. The fire then covered 35 acres.

"There needs to be a good reason why you waited to use those tools until it was up and running," said Hicks, who was a smokejumper with the U.S. Forest Service.

"That's the worst time to order up those expensive resources, when a fire is up and running."

Hicks said he has learned to consider the costs of firefighting when reviewing decisions about fire campaigns. He encountered an unspoken reluctance to incur costs when he conducted a probe of the June 30, 2013, deaths of 19 hot shot firefighters in Yarnell, Ariz.

"Most every time, they'll deny that, but it does come into play," he said.

Jordan said a Chinook dipped a 2,600-gallon Bambi Bucket 10 times into the West Prong of the Pigeon River to dump about 26,000 gallons of water on the fire.

"I didn't think there were pools big enough for that," he said of the nearby river.

The Chinook used all its fuel and the available daylight and had to cease operations.

Two Helitanker Sky Cranes also joined the effort. Each Helitanker sucked 1,000-gallons of water from Fontana Lake using a snorkel to fill belly tanks. Each Helitanker made three dumps with water obtained 13 miles away before nightfall ended the operation.

Before winds whipped the flames across the park and toward Gatlinburg, the aerial attack dumped less water than 5 percent of what it would take to fill an Olympic-size swimming pool.

High winds and poor visibility from smoke prevented helicopters from flying again until Dec. 1 when a recon flight was made. Three helicopters on Dec. 2 dumped 55,836 gallons of water on fires. Four helicopters on Dec. 3 dumped 66,300 gallons of water.

Fire retardant was not used because of the proximity of water sources to the fires.

Jordan said Salansky on Nov. 27 requested a module of firefighters and additional fire engines to supplement the park's fire staff and three engines. That brought firefighting resources to five, four-wheel drive wildland fire engines, and 27 firefighters.

"He scouted with them Sunday to get acquainted with the fire for Monday," Jordan said. "Those were the resources he thought he needed to contain the fire."

No one monitors fire on move

Throughout the day Nov. 27, the weather service warned of approaching high winds, relative humidity ranging from 15-35 percent and severe drought conditions.

A weather service alert at 9:28 p.m. forecast winds strong enough to "down trees and power lines" Monday afternoon. Gusts of 58 mph or more were expected.

The weather inversion that had kept flames down was gone.

So park firefighters and requested reinforcements went to bed, leaving no one overnight to monitor the Chimney Tops 2 fire.

"The fire was not staffed at night due to falling rocks and dangerous snags," stated a news release from the National Park.

Great Smoky Mountains National Park Deputy Superintendent Clay Jordan points to the site of the Chimney Tops 1 and 2 fires on Dec. 8, 2016.

Jordan, however, provided different reasons for abandoning a fire 5.5 miles from Gatlinburg.

Jordan said he would have to verify his comments with Salansky, but Jordan was "fairly certain" of three reasons for not monitoring the fire, as mandated by National Park Service policy.

First, Salansky would not expect the fire to spread to another ridge, a process called spotting. Second, the fire officer wanted a full staff the next day and didn't want to relinquish personnel to a fire watch.

And even if monitors witnessed embers blown from the Chimney Tops 2 fire a half-mile away over Newfound Gap Road and onto Mount LeConte, there was no way to extinguish the new flames.

"That's not reasonable at all," Gabbert said. "With a weather forecast like that, you would have monitors."

Anyone sitting in the bed of a pickup at the established pull-off along Newfound Gap Road below Chimney Tops should have seen red-hot embers sailing across the two-lane road.

Gabbert said a monitor would have provided an earlier outcry to surrounding communities that the fire was moving toward Gatlinburg.

National Park Service policy states, "All wildland fire events must be monitored."

The national policy states monitoring of fires increases knowledge of fire behavior; provides information for decision making; helps assess if the fire management plan is successful; assists with contingency planning; and ensures protection of life and property.

Park employees about 7 a.m. Nov. 28 noticed the fire had spotted to Bull Head Trail on Mount LeConte, a process that surprised experienced firefighters at the park. In 11 hours, gusting winds would sweep the firestorm into Gatlinburg.

"We could have had a thousand firefighters and fire engines end to end on the road (Newfound Gap), and you're not going to stop that fire," Jordan said.

Gabbert agreed wind is the firefighter's nemesis.

"Wind can override everything," Gabbert said. "Extreme wind causes extreme fire.

"It's not common in the South, but long-distance spotting can occur under extreme wind conditions. When a fire is spotting, it sends thousands of embers, some small and some as large as pinecones."

Flames march to Gatlinburg

Flames jumped from ridgetop to ridgetop during the night of Nov. 27. Firefighters were assigned to stop flames threatening the picnic area below Chimney Tops, but by 11 a.m. the fire covered about 500 acres.

Salansky's containment lines had failed.

By 11:30 a.m., fire had spotted to the Twin Creeks science and visitor facilities, about 1.5- miles from the park's boundary.

"For a fire to do that, it has to hop a ridge, burn and create embers to hop to the next ridge," Jordan said. "For a fire to move three miles in a few hours is impressive.

The fires in Gatlinburg as seen from the Park Grill on Nov. 28, 2016.

"None of our firefighters have ever seen a fire hop like that in the Southeast in such a short time."

Jordan said Salansky recommended Gatlinburg Fire Chief Greg Miller issue a voluntary evacuation of Mynatt Park, the nearest city development to Twin Creeks. Miller did so about noon.

Throughout the day, Miller had been issuing mutual aid requests for firefighters around the region. Jordan said it appeared Miller was prepared to battle flames encroaching from the park.

Miller, however, did not issue a city-wide mandatory evacuation until 8:30 p.m., more than two hours after flames had ignited more than 20 structures. By then, flames had disrupted electrical service and cellphone service, frustrating attempts to send emergency alerts to the public.

"If that was the only threat to the city, he had the proper amount of resources," Jordan said. "But that quickly changed."

Winds measured at 87 mph around 9 p.m. toppled trees onto power lines, bringing sparking lines down onto moisture-free leaves. Fires erupted throughout the city and high winds carried embers to houses and businesses.

Officials said the firestorm forced more than 4,000 residents and about 10,000 tourists to flee.

Ultimately, more than 780 wildland firefighters from 40 states and the District of Columbia joined the battle, using 61 fire engines, seven helicopters and five bulldozers. Flames covered nearly 18,000 acres.

Costs so far are estimated at $8.8 million.

Another 200 firefighters from department across the state responded to Miller's calls for aid. The costs of their efforts have not been tallied.

DO NOT USE THIS PHOTO>>>> MARCIA 
  Cars burn in front of the main entrance of the Westgate Smoky Mountain Resort in Gatlinburg on Tuesday, Nov. 29, 2016, during the middle of the wildfire that ravaged Sevier County.

The fire was responsible for 14 deaths, 191 injuries, damage or destruction to more than 2,400 structures and in excess of $500 million in damages.

Behind the destructive high winds came the promised rain. Almost an inch fell late Monday night. More than 2 inches were delivered Wednesday morning.

"I was never so happy to get wet," Jordan said. Without the rain, controlling fires in and outside the park "would have been challenging," he said.

Veteran firefighter Hicks was blunter.

"We like to take responsibility for putting these fires out, but it's really the weather that provides the opportunity for firefighters to act," Hicks said.

Jordan said he expects a fire of this magnitude to undergo an evaluation for lessons that can be applied to fires in the future.

"I think at some point there will be a fair review to see if there are some lessons learned," he said.

The National Park Service said Thursday an "Individual Fire Review" will be conducted of the Chimney Tops 2 fire.

"A team will be appointed by the NPS' Division of Fire and Aviation Management, which reports to the Associate Director for Visitor and Resource Protection," the NPS said.

"The team will be comprised of wildland fire Subject Matter Experts from both within and outside the agency and will review the park's preparedness and response to this fire, with emphasis on lessons learned that can be used to strengthen wildland fire programs across the Federal land management agencies that ​manage​ wildland fires."

The National Park Service, however, will not launch the review until the agency is sure the examination will "not interfere with the criminal investigation underway." The agency will coordinate the beginning of the review with the U. S.  Attorney's Office and the 4th Judicial District Attorney General, which is prosecuting the two teens accused of starting the fire.

Former Lady Vol Lisa McGill Reagan looks for personal belongings she could save in the rubble of her home in Gatlinburg on Saturday, Dec. 3, 2016.

The completed review will be made available to the public, the National Park Service said.

Three of the retired U. S. Forest Service firefighters, however, expressed a lack of confidence in reviews conducted by officials in Washington, D.C. They said a congressional review would be more fruitful.

Previous reviews by the National Park Service arrived at the same conclusions the retired U.S. Forest Service employees reached about the Gatlinburg fire.

A report on July 23, 2012, Reading Fire in Lassen Volcanic National Park in California seems similar to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park fire.

The Reading Fire was started by a lightning strike during drought conditions, but firefighters treated it as a beneficial burn and established containment lines around it. For two weeks the fire followed the plan, then high winds carried embers 1.5 miles over the containment area.

With low relative humidity and high energy release component values from the flames, the fire burned 28,079 acres.

"We didn't pay enough attention early on to weather and fire behavior," a firefighter admitted.

"We were working on a schedule at this point," said a crew leader. "But the fire wasn't working on that same schedule."

Firefighters failed to plan for a worst case scenario, the report noted. Park staff had successfully controlled previous fires, causing them to underestimate the newest fire's potential.

Just as at Chimney Tops 2, the Reading Fire moved from a sparse fuel area to a fuel rich area. The report noted weather changes during the Reading Fire should have been incorporated into plans on the fire response.

And firefighters failed to request additional resources and crews early enough to handle the growing menace.

Despite the professional shortcomings, the Reading Fire report noted fire officers followed established protocols.

Destroyed buildings on Ski Mountain Road in Gatlinburg, Dec. 6, 2016.

Jordan also said the Great Smoky Mountains National Park fire staff followed protocol when dealing with the Chimney Tops 2 fire.

"I don't think you can hang your hat on, ‘Well, protocol was followed and we killed 14 people,'" Hicks said.

"There were options that they had and they didn't exercise them and it turned out bad. Sometimes it doesn't go bad on them and no one knows. This one did."

The News Sentinel submitted four pages of questions and requests for clarifications about the fire to Jordan and park spokeswoman Dana Soehn and asked if Salansky could be interviewed.

"Thank you for reaching out to us with your questions and requests for clarifications," Soehn responded. "We appreciate your ongoing efforts to provide accurate information in your articles.

"At this time, we are unable to fully respond to your request for information related to the Chimney Tops 2 Fire due to the active, ongoing investigation related to the two juveniles charged with arson.

"We have been advised by the District Attorney General that ‘state law limits or forbids the release of information where juveniles are alleged to be responsible…' The District Attorney General further advises that ‘any release of information at this time would be extremely premature and could compromise the investigation.'"

Hicks, who has been frustrated in ferreting out the truth about the deaths of the 19 members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots in Yarnell, Ariz., wasn't optimistic about transparency in the Chimney Tops 2 Fire.

"There's lessons to be learned, but it's going to be difficult to get the truth out with these legal restrictions," Hicks said.

"People want to blame the firefighters or the people overseeing the fire. The whole management organization has to be reviewed about the decisions that were made.

"But there will never be an opportunity for them to talk in the next five years."

Gatlinburg and the National Park reopened Dec. 9 to the public.

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